Kantian Reasons for Reasons

Ratio 20 (3):264-277 (2007)
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Abstract

Rüdiger Bittner has recently argued against a Kantian ‘maxims account’ of reasons for action. In this paper I argue—against Bittner—that Kantian maxims are not to be understood as reasons for action, but rather as reasons for reasons. On the interpretation presented here, Kantian maxims are the reasons for an agent’s being motivated by whatever more immediate reasons actually motivate her. This understanding of Kantian maxims suggests a recognizably realist Kantian position in ethics.

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Noell Birondo
University of Texas at El Paso

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Maxims and virtues.Talbot Brewer - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):539-572.
Maxims and Virtues.Talbot Brewer - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):539-572.

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