Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265 (2004)

Authors
Alexander James Bird
Cambridge University
Abstract
Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00350.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Role of Trust in Knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
Subjective and Objective Confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
Testimony and Observation.C. A. J. Coady - 1973 - American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (2):149-155.
Knowledge as Evidence.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):1-25.
Domain of Discourse.Christopher Gauker - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):1-32.

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Citations of this work BETA

XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
Reliability for Degrees of Belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.
Some Evidence is False.Alexander Arnold - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.
Evidence and Inference.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):299-317.

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