Princeton University Press (2008)

Abstract
It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian decision theory--and when does it need to be modified? Using a minimum of mathematics, Rational Decisions clearly explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds. The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress. In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies. Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2011
Buy this book $8.88 used (75% off)   $22.98 new (34% off)   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 0691149895   9780691130743   0691130744   9780691149899
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,577
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Functionalism and the Role of Psychology in Economics.Christopher Clarke - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (4):292-310.
In Defence of Revealed Preference Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (2):163-187.

View all 55 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
Bayesian Probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127.
Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
An Introduction to Decision Theory.Martin Peterson - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.
Decision Theory and the Rationality of Further Deliberation.Igor Douven - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):303-328.
A Peircean Theory of Decision.Berit Brogaard - 1999 - Synthese 118 (3):383-401.
Bayesian Subjunctive Conditionals for Games and Decisions.Brian Skyrms - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:161-172.
A Minimal Extension of Bayesian Decision Theory.Ken Binmore - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (3):341-362.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-02-06

Total views
5 ( #1,211,364 of 2,533,599 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #163,878 of 2,533,599 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes