Osteoporosis and risk of fracture: reference class problems are real

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 43 (5):375-400 (2022)
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Abstract

Elselijn Kingma argues that Christopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory does not show how the reference classes it uses—namely, age groups of a sex of a species—are objective and naturalistic. Boorse has replied that this objection is of no concern, because there are no examples of clinicians’ choosing to use reference classes other than the ones he suggests. Boorse argues that clinicians use the reference classes they do because these reflect the natural classes of organisms to which their patients belong. Drawing on a thorough exploration of how the disease osteoporosis is defined in adults, I argue that clinicians do indeed make choices about which reference classes to use in diagnosis. Clinicians use young adult reference classes to diagnose osteoporosis in elderly patients. They also use young female reference classes to diagnose osteoporosis in elderly males. Clinicians adjust their reference classes so that the diagnosis of osteoporosis reflects a person’s risk of sustaining a fragility fracture. The ethical intuition that people with the same risk of fracture should receive the same diagnosis overwhelms the naturalistic intuition that reference classes should reflect natural classes of organisms of uniform functional design. Clinicians construct a variety of reference class types, including pathological reference classes and epidemiological population-specific reference classes, to serve this ethical intuition. I show how clinicians use several reference classes at once so that they can more accurately predict risk of fracture. Ultimately, the reference classes chosen and used in medical practice are quite different from those proposed in naturalistic philosophy of medicine.

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References found in this work

Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
A Second Rebuttal On Health.Christopher Boorse - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):683-724.
Disease.Rachel Cooper - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (2):263-282.
What is it to be healthy?Elselijn Kingma - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):128–133.
Progress in Defining Disease: Improved Approaches and Increased Impact.Peter H. Schwartz - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (4):485-502.

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