A theory of practical reason

Philosophical Review 74 (4):423-448 (1965)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a concept of "valid reasoning" that will apply univocally to reasoned judgment (inference), Reasoned decision (choice), And reasoned withholding of judgment and decision. "reasoning" is taken to include all these; "validity" of reasoning is defined in terms of the "ideally rational mind", Which is in turn defined by a modal logic of judging and deciding. The definition is defended by relating it to another ideal, That of the socratically omniscient and stoically omniscient sage, Who is defined by a modal logic of knowing and doing. In the course of this I distinguish between the vehicle and the description of a mental act, Deny that reasoning is a transition, Analyze doing as causing to be, And maintain that, Since doing stands to deciding as knowing stands to judging, Reasoned decision is genuinely practical reasoning

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Citations of this work

Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The National Science Foundation and philosophy of science's withdrawal from social concerns.Krist Vaesen & Joel Katzav - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 78 (C):73-82.
¿Qué es la argumentación práctica?Julder Gómez - 2017 - Co-herencia 14 (27):215-243.
Validity and Practical Reasoning.David Mitchell - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (254):477 - 500.
Formal logic and practical reasoning.Bruce Aune - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (3):301-320.

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