Abstract

In recent philosophical discussions of democracy, there has been interest in the role that reason plays in the deliberation of democratic lawmaking. In this dissertation, I explore a concept of reason that may be adequate for the task that democracy sets for it. For this, I start with Immanuel Kant's idea of a "public use of reason," which he developed in the context of articulating his understanding of enlightenment. Taking Kant's reflections as a point of departure, I begin to articulate a concept of reason which I call public reason. I continue to develop the concept of public reason through an examination of similar ideas in the writings of Hannah Arendt, John Rawls, and Jurgen Habermas. ;I argue that in Kant's concept of enlightenment , we find a concept of reason that is "dialogical" rather than "monological" . While Kant does recognize political implications of this idea, he does not fully explore them. I move on to argue that while Arendt rejects the political use of reason, her concepts of action and persuasion can contribute to a concept of reason which addresses her concerns about the dangers of reason in politics. I then examine Rawls's idea of public reason. While Rawls makes important contributions, I argue against his notion that public reason should exclude certain kinds of arguments from certain kinds of political debates . Next, I examine Habermas's concept of communicative reason, which is the most developed and promising concept of reason for my purposes. I examine several debates that have come up between these different perspectives, giving particular emphasis to the recent debate between Rawls and Habermas. Finally, I draw together these four perspectives to show that each can make contributions to a concept of public reason which can play an important part in our understanding of democracy