Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology

Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2045-2076 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

How should modal reasoning proceed? Here we compare abduction-based and conceiving-based modal epistemologies, and argue that an abduction-based approach is preferable, and by a wide margin.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,737

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Abduction and Modality.Stephen Biggs - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
Propositional Abduction in Modal Logic.Marta Cialdea Mayer & Fiora Pirri - 1995 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 3 (6):907-919.
The a priority of abduction.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):735-758.
Projectual Abduction.Giovanni Tuzet - 2006 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 14 (2):151-160.
Hansonian and Harmanian abduction as models of discovery.Sami Paavola - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):93 – 108.
How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? Mcauliffe - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (3):300-319.
From Modal Skepticism to Modal Empiricism.Felipe Leon - 2017 - In Robert William Fischer Felipe Leon (ed.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Springer Verlag.
Hale on the Architecture of Modal Knowledge.Bob Fischer - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):76-89.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-14

Downloads
131 (#100,213)

6 months
14 (#80,314)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Stephen Biggs
Iowa State University
Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto at Scarborough

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
What do philosophers believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.

View all 74 references / Add more references