Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789 (2014)

Authors
Brian Besong
Saint Francis University
Abstract
According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally good phenomenological credentials supporting their disputed moral beliefs. However, it is implausible to think that commonplace disagreement seriously undermines moral knowledge, and thus it is implausible to think that the standard account of moral intuitionism is true
Keywords Moral epistemology  Moral intuitionism  Seemings  Disagreement  Skepticism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0420-7
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.

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Citations of this work BETA

Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.
Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):590-611.
Disagreements in Moral Intution as Defeaters.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):282-302.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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