Williamson on Indicatives and Suppositional Heuristics

Synthese (1):1-12 (2022)
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Abstract

Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that the semantics of the indicative ‘if’ is given by the material conditional. Putative counterexamples can be handled by better understanding the role played in our assessment of indicatives by a fallible cognitive heuristic, called the Suppositional Procedure. Williamson’s Suppositional Conjecture has it that the Suppositional Procedure is humans’ primary way of prospectively assessing conditionals. This paper raises some doubts on the Suppositional Procedure and Conjecture.

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Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews

References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
A philosophical guide to conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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