Topics of Thought. The Logic of Knowledge, Belief, Imagination

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2022)
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Abstract

When one thinks—knows, believes, imagines—that something is the case, one’s thought has a topic: it is about something, towards which one’s mind is directed. What is the logic of thought, so understood? This book begins to explore the idea that, to answer the question, we should take topics seriously. It proposes a hyperintensional account of the propositional contents of thought, arguing that these are individuated not only by the set of possible worlds at which they are true, but also by their topic: what they are about. The book then builds epistemic, doxastic, probabilistic, and conditional logics based on this view. It applies them to issues ranging from dogmatism, scepticism, and epistemic fallibilism, to imagination and suppositional reasoning, belief revision, framing effects, and the acceptability of indicative conditionals.

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Author Profiles

Franz Berto
University of St. Andrews
Peter Hawke
Lingnan University

References found in this work

Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.
An object‐based truthmaker semantics for modals.Friederike Moltmann - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):255-288.

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