The Nature of Cognition: Minimum Requirements for a Personalistic Epistemology

Review of Metaphysics 8 (1):49 - 60 (1954)
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Abstract

For a response to be personal, then, is for it to be a total response in which aesthetic, moral, perceptual, rational, and religious dimensions may be discriminated, though one particular dimension may be in focus or dominant at any one moment. In the remainder of this paper we shall focus on that abstract phase of the total response which we call perceptual, without prejudice to evaluative responses accompanying it. The "situation experienced," to use E. S. Brightman's terminology, is an undeniable complex within which most of these factors-in-response can usually be distinguished.

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