Abstract

Consider two entities x and y, and a relation R which holds among them. Is R’s existence accountable merely in terms of the non relational properties exhibited by x and y, once they interact? Or, is it more appropriate to say that R is independent of x and y, and these acquire sets of relational properties because of their being related through R? In case the former option obtains, the existence of relations is reducible to the relevant properties of the related terms. As a consequence, some version of antirealism or eliminativism towards relations turns out to be true. Otherwise they are irreducible, and ontological analysis cannot be dispensed with relations treated as basic or primitive entities. The first section of my paper provides a framework for handling ontological facts about relations. I will address the assessment of the notions of internal and external relations by K. Mulligan. In the second section I will put my cards on the table. My purpose is to defend a Moorean approach to relations, i.e. both internal and external relations exist. I will briefly outline my methodology, and I will comment on the kind of evidence usually referred to in the debate. My view is that evolutionary research on groups behavior may play an important role. In the third section of the paper I will show that commonsense intuitions on relationships among human beings endorse an external reading of relations. My claim is supported by notorious examples drawn from literature. In the final section I will consider whether evolutionary research on human prosociality provides an empirical setting for the assessment of the commonsense understanding of (at least some) relations in terms of externality. I expand such setting to include behaviors of social animal in general (i.e., animals whose behaviors depends on groups’ hierarchy), and I advance a few reason why empirical research needs postulating the independent existence of relations