Philosophiques 15 (2):390-404 (1988)

Abstract
Dans cet article, nous considérons un paradoxe sceptique que Saul Kripke a attribué à Wittgenstein. Nous critiquons la solution directe proposée par Colin McGinn , qui a recours à la théorie causale de la référence, et nous montrons pourquoi cette solution n'est pas satisfaisante. La solution sceptique que Kripke prête à Wittgenstein est ensuite discutée à la lumière de nos considérations sur la théorie causale, ce qui nous amène à constater qu'elle est aussi insuffisante. Nous concluons en montrant que nous ne sommes pas d'emblée contraints d'accepter le paradoxe.We consider a sceptical paradox which Saul Kripke has attributed to Wittgenstein. We criticize the direct solution proposed by Colin McGinn, which resorts to the causal theory of reference, and we show why this solution in not satisfying. The sceptical solution which Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein is then discussed in the light of our considerations on the causal theory ; this leads us to ascertain that it is also insufficient. We conclude by showing that we don't really need to accept the paradox as it is first presented
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DOI 10.7202/027052ar
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
The Individual Strikes Back.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):281-302.

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