On the nature and systematic role of evidence: Husserl as a proponent of mentalist evidentialism?

European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):98-117 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl, (a) evidence determines epistemic justification and (b) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one's ultimate evidence consists of one's originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Although Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely, their originary givenness.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,074

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-25

Downloads
79 (#268,674)

6 months
8 (#635,425)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Philipp Berghofer
University of Graz

Citations of this work

From Phenomenological-Hermeneutical Approaches to Realist Perspectivism.Mahdi Khalili - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (4):1-26.
Husserl’s Noetics – Towards a Phenomenological Epistemology.Philipp Berghofer - 2018 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (2):120-138.
Back to Infallible Evidence.Zhongwei Li - forthcoming - Husserl Studies:1-34.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Logical Investigations.Edmund Husserl & J. N. Findlay - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):384-398.
Experience and Judgment.Edmund Husserl, L. Landgrebe, J. S. Churchill & K. Ameriks - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 39 (4):712-713.
Evidence.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.

View all 25 references / Add more references