Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635 (2012)
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Abstract |
Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik’s arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.
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Keywords | Consciousness Conceptualism Color Concepts |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1016/j.concog.2011.03.023 |
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References found in this work BETA
Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
The Myth of Color Sensations, or How Not to See a Yellow Banana.Pete Mandik - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):228-240.
Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):641-643.
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