Abstract

In this article the author critically examines well-known arguments which purport to show that death is not something bad for the person who dies, and tries to show that these arguments are not sound, that is, the author tries to show that death really is something bad for person who died. The author believes that Williams did not show that eternal life would be unbearable and that death after sufficiently long life would be a relief. Furthermore, famous Epicurus ' argument against the fear of death author splits into two related but nevertheless separated arguments, and tries to show that the first one is based on false or at least questionable theory of value, while the other one represents a serious intellectual challenge. Different answers to Lucretius' argument from the asymmetry of past and future nonexistence are examined; the author argues that none of these answers is completely satisfactory. Finally, the author examines and rejects "mathematical argument" against the fear of death as invalid.