Classical Compatibilism

In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 4-51 (2017)
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Bernard Berofsky
Columbia University

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The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays.Paul Russell - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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