A new prospect for epistemic aggregation

Episteme 10 (3):269-281 (2013)
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Abstract

How should the opinion of a group be related to the opinions of the group members? In this article, we will defend a package of four norms – coherence, locality, anonymity and unanimity. Existing results show that there is no tenable procedure for aggregating outright beliefs or for aggregating credences that meet these criteria. In response, we consider the prospects for aggregating credal pairs – pairs of prior probabilities and evidence. We show that there is a method of aggregating credal pairs that possesses all four virtues.

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Author Profiles

Daniel Berntson
Uppsala University
Yoaav Isaacs
Baylor University

Citations of this work

On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.

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References found in this work

Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
The discursive dilemma as a lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):301-319.

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