Autonomy and Free Will

In J. S. Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contermporary Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

If the incompatibilist is right, determinism annuls free will, but not necessarily autonomy. The possibly deterministic origin of values and beliefs that are objectively grounded does not undermine the autonomy of agents who maintain these for the right reasons. Nonobjective perspectives—preferences about lifestyle, profession, choice of mate— cannot anyway be entirely removed even for an unlimited being. Moreover, if one were lucky to have inherited contingencies that mesh perfectly with the world one happened to inhabit even if it is deterministic, one would have the capacity for perfect autonomy. The extreme incompatibilist position that autonomy requires creation of self ex nihilo is incoherent.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,509

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Believing Autonomously.Mark Leon - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:169-183.
Autonomy, Consent and the Law.Sheila McLean - 2009 - Routledge-Cavendish.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Intention, Autonomy, and Brain Events.Grant Gillett - 2009 - Bioethics 23 (6):330-339.
Autonomy, Self-Control and Weakness of Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-03

Downloads
8 (#980,062)

6 months
1 (#417,896)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bernard Berofsky
Columbia University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references