Philosophia Mathematica 28 (1):60-76 (2020)

Authors
Bruno Bentzen
Zhejiang University
Abstract
In a series of papers Ladyman and Presnell raise an interesting challenge of providing a pre-mathematical justification for homotopy type theory. In response, they propose what they claim to be an informal semantics for homotopy type theory where types and terms are regarded as mathematical concepts. The aim of this paper is to raise some issues which need to be resolved for the successful development of their types-as-concepts interpretation.
Keywords Homotopy type theory  Type theory  Justification
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/nkz014
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References found in this work BETA

The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen.Gerhard Gentzen - 1969 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..

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Citations of this work BETA

On Different Ways of Being Equal.Bruno Bentzen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
Sense, Reference, and Computation.Bruno Bentzen - 2020 - Perspectiva Filosófica 47 (2):179-203.

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