What relational egalitarians should (not) believe

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals; and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up (1).

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Author Profiles

Lauritz Munch
Aarhus University
Andreas Bengtson
Aarhus University

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