There are vague objects (in any sense in which there are ordinary objects)

Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (3):1-4 (2008)
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Abstract

Ordinary objects are vague, because either (i) composition is restricted, or (ii) there really are no such objects (but we still want to talk about them), or (iii) because such objects are not metaphysically (independently of us) distinguishable from other 'extra-ordinary' objects. In any sense in which there are ordinary objects, they are vague.

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10.12697/spe.2008.1.3.01

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Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg

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Contingencies within Spacetime.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Rennes 1

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):701-708.

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