Review: Emotions Are Not Mere Judgments [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):450 - 457 (2004)
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Abstract

The search for the essence of emotions is a common feature of various views of emotions—many of which attempt to reduce emotions to one central component. Three major views that seek to define emotions via a basic component are: that emotions are essentially a cognitive-evaluative state; that emotions are feelings; that emotions are desires. I believe that all these reductions are inadequate. I focus here on as expressed in Nussbaum’s recent view of emotions. I begin, however, by briefly discussing and.

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Aaron Ben-Ze’ev
University of Haifa

References found in this work

A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.

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