Abstract
The broad, ancient notion of the “soul” was replaced by Descartes with a more narrow notion of the “mind.” As well as limiting the scope of the soul, Descartes separated it from the body, giving the soul a substantive status. These two features gave rise to severe conceptual problems which remain unsolved till the present day. I believe that retaining some features of the ancient notion of the “soul”—particularly those found in Aristotle’s view—may resolve many of these problems. As an alternative approach I suggest the following three assumptions concerning the nature of the soul : the soul consists of dispositional and actualized states and not of internal, isolated entities; physiological and mental states are not actually separate but belong to two different levels of description, hence the relation between them is that of correlation and not of causality; mental and physical states can be arranged along a spectrum ranging from simple to more complex states. This approach treats mental properties just as common sense and science treat other natural properties. Thus, many of the traditional problems concerning the mind-body gap disappear. Though the approach presented here returns, in some aspects, to the ancient, broad notion of the soul, I will continue to use the term “mind” which is used more today.