Abstract

The token identity theory, the claim that each mental event is identical to some physical event, remains a popular view in the philosophy of mind. However, it has been the target of a number of interesting and important criticisms, and broadly physicalist alternatives to the token identity theory are on the rise. I defend the token identity theory against these recent 'token dualist' challenges. ;I begin by clarifying the token identity and token dualist theses. What does it mean to claim---or to deny---that all mental events are identical to physical events? An important aspect of that question concerns how to classify events as mental or physical. I suggest several principles that could be used, in search of one that will be amenable to both parties. Discussion of these principles involves, among other things, an extended discussion of how to best characterize physicalism. ;I then consider several arguments against the version of the token identity theory that emerges, and conclude that many of them fail. The only fruitful way to argue against token identity is to argue that mental and physical events differ in their essential properties. This is a familiar and forceful line of argument; it parallels the one standardly used to show that objects are distinct from the matter that constitutes them. However, it should be challenged, for at least two reasons. First, I argue that token dualists cannot account for the non-overdeterministic causal efficacy of mental events, and that the recently popular 'non-competition' solution will not help them. Second, I provide a general argument against the claim that there can be distinct colocated things that differ only in their modal properties. The existence of such things would mean that there is no way to make sense of modal properties in the first place. ;Consequently, there is strong reason to look for a way to understand de re modal claims that does not entail the existence of things that differ only modally. In the final chapter, I discuss the available options, several of which allow the token identity theory to withstand the essentialist arguments that threaten it