Abstract

The author attempts to demonstrate that the way in which Husserl is analysing 'meaning' in his 1st Logical Investigation, may be considered to be a test case for intentionality. Even at this early stage intentionality, which henceforth becomes a permanent model, is recognized as 'meaning', i.e. as signifying an object. Such an interpretation of the 'meaning' phenomenon is greatly diverging from the reductive intuitionism often attributed to Husserl. 'Meaning' is not dependent on intuition but constitutes by itselfa relation to an object: it is merely a reference to objectivity and as such has no other content. Likewise rejected by Husserl are the interpretation of 'meaning' as mentally representing an object otherwise posited by intuition, and, beyond that model, the interpretation of 'meaning' as existing on its own, constituting a self-reliant entity. To the idea of making sense the author thus wants to restore its origination and originality by demonstrating that it does not allow for any analysis in terms of 'meaning', as a result of which it would be reduced to the order of a 'thing'