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Could Sherlock Holmes Have Existed?
Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):175-181 (2010)
Abstract
In Naming and Necessity Kripke argued against the possible existence of fictional characters. I show that his argument is invalid, analyze the confusion it involves, and explain why the view that fictional characters could not have existed is implausible.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
More on Fictional Names and Psychologistic Semantics: Replies to Comments.Emar Maier - 2017 - Theoretical Linguistics 43 (1-2):103-120.
Necessarily, Sherlock Holmes Is Not a Person.David Liebesman - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (3):306-318.
The Extraordinary Impossibility of Sherlock Holmes.Ben Caplan - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):335-355.
Why Rigidity?Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2014 - In J. Berg (ed.), Naming, Necessity and More: Explorations in the Philosophical Work of Saul Kripke. Palgrave. pp. 3-21.
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