New York ;Oxford University Press (2006)

David Benatar
University of Cape Town
Better Never to Have Been argues for a number of related, highly provocative, views: (1) Coming into existence is always a serious harm. (2) It is always wrong to have children. (3) It is wrong not to abort fetuses at the earlier stages of gestation. (4) It would be better if, as a result of there being no new people, humanity became extinct. These views may sound unbelievable--but anyone who reads Benatar will be obliged to take them seriously.
Keywords Life
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Reprint years 2008
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Call number BD431.B3919 2006
ISBN(s) 9780199549269   0199549265
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Well-Being.Roger Crisp - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Social choice ethics in artificial intelligence.Seth D. Baum - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (1):165-176.
Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives.Jeff McMahan - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):5-35.
Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to My Critics.David Benatar - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):121-151.
Harming as Causing Harm.Elizabeth Harman - 2009 - In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. pp. 137--154.

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