A Structuralist Defence of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):75-98 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper addresses John Searle's criticism of the integrated information theory of consciousness. Among other things, Searle claimed that, since information is a syntactic notion, IITC cannot account for the content of consciousness. He also argued that IITC cannot explain consciousness in causal terms. In this paper, I demonstrate that the original formulation of IITC is compatible with a structuralist reading. After that, I explain how a structuralist reconstruction of IITC could deal with the objections that Searle raised. Among other things, I argue that IITC could provide genuine scientific explanations of consciousness, but the explanations are to be presented in structural, rather than causal, terms.

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Majid D. Beni
Middle East Technical University

Citations of this work

The Curious Incident of Indistinguishable Selves A Reply to Nešić.Majid D. Beni - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):261-268.

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