Abstract

It is undeniable that the skeptic's argument can grip you. How can you claim to know that you are not right now dreaming? And if you can't, how can you claim that you know anything about the external world? Some philosophers have argued that we may insist that the skeptic's inference from "You do not know that you are not now dreaming" to "You do not know you have hands" is illegitimate, because it relies on the false principle that knowledge is closed under known entailment. I argue that this principle is true and, more importantly, that the force of the skeptic's argument does not rest on its truth. ;Responding to the skeptic can take either a direct or diagnostic route. The direct route tries to show that the skeptic's premises do not lead to the skeptic's conclusion. I do not believe this will meet with success. The diagnostic route locates the apparent force of the skeptic's argument in some part of it that is non-compulsory or a set of considerations that allow us to circumvent the argument altogether. This is the route I take. ;Skepticism, I claim, is not in essence a theoretical problem, i.e., a problem about the structure of our knowledge of the external world. This was G. E. Moore's insight into skepticism. Though rightfully criticized for not adequately explaining where he thought the skeptic goes wrong, Moore, I claim, was sensitive to where the force of the skeptic's argument lies---in the capacity to challenge a particular knowledge claim. ;Once we appreciate that a theoretical response won't address the skeptic's argument, we see our way to a set of considerations that might. I attempt to articulate a view I call "particularism", according to which our fundamental justificatory principles do not have underived authority, but rather an authority that is derived from particular cases of knowledge. Appreciating the nature of the authority these principles, I claim, explains the grip of the skeptic's argument, and provides a way of resistance.