Authors
Gordon Belot
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
I argue that the conviction, widespread among philosophers, that substantivalism enjoys a clear superiority over relationalism in both Newtonian and relativistic physics is ill-founded. There are viable relationalist approaches to understanding these theories, and the substantival-relational debate should be of interest to philosophers and physicists alike, because of its connection with questions about the correct space of states for various physical theories.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/02698599908573606
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,039
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Space, Time, and Spacetime.Lawrence Sklar - 1974 - University of California Press.
A Subject with No Object.Zoltan Gendler Szabo, John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):106.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A New Approach to the Relational‐Substantival Debate.Jill North - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 11:3-43.
Relationalism Rehabilitated? I: Classical Mechanics.Oliver Pooley & Harvey R. Brown - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):183--204.
Some Philosophical Prehistory of the (Earman-Norton) Hole Argument.James Owen Weatherall - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 70:79-87.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
171 ( #68,484 of 2,505,611 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #169,997 of 2,505,611 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes