More lives, better lives

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):127-141 (2003)
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Abstract

Although many people believe that more people would be better, arguments intended to show this are unconvincing. I consider one of Parfit's arguments for a related conclusion, that even when both are worth living, we ought to prefer the better of two lives. Were this argument successful, or so I claim, then it would follow that more people would be better. But there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives. Nor is an attempted rejoinder effective. We can agree that there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives, and yet still maintain there are reasons for improving lives

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Citations of this work

Parenthood and Procreation.Tim Bayne & Avery Kolers - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity.Per Algander - 2013 - Dissertation, Uppsala University

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Ethics of Killing.Jeff Mcmahan - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):477-490.
Is it Good to Make Happy People?Stuart Rachels - 1998 - Bioethics 12 (2):93-110.

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