Gettierized Knobe effects

Episteme 10 (3):219-240 (2013)
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Abstract

We report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution

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James R. Beebe
University at Buffalo

Citations of this work

Knowledge and Luck.John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 22 (2):378-390.
Social functions of knowledge attributions.James R. Beebe - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--242.
Don't Believe the Hype: Why Should Philosophical Theories Yield to Intuitions?Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):141-158.
Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.

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References found in this work

The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

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