Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):727-740 (2019)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
According to the dogmatist, knowing p makes it rational to disregard future evidence against p. The standard response to the dogmatist holds that knowledge is defeasible: acquiring evidence against something you know undermines your knowledge. However, this response leaves a residual puzzle, according to which knowledge makes it rational to intend to disregard future counterevidence. I argue that we can resolve this residual puzzle by turning to an unlikely source: Kavka’s toxin puzzle. One lesson of the toxin puzzle is that it is irrational to intend to do that which you know will be irrational. This yields a simple reply to the dogmatist: it is irrational to intend to disregard future evidence because you can know in advance that it will be irrational to do so.
|
Keywords | dogmatism toxin puzzle misleading evidence intention defeat |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2018.1556309 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):495-515.
View all 6 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Collateral Conflicts and Epistemic Norms.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Similar books and articles
Contrastive Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.
Emergence and Control of Fluoroquinolone‐Resistant, Toxin A–Negative, Toxin B–Positive Clostridium Difficile.Denise Drudy, Norma Harnedy, Séamus Fanning, Margaret Hannan & Lorraine Kyne - 2007 - Emergence: Complexity and Organization 28 (8):932-940.
On a Problem for Contractarianism.Joe Mintoff - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):98 – 116.
How Sincere is the Dogmatist?Gordon Stanley & John Martin - 1964 - Psychological Review 71 (4):331-334.
Parmenides of Elea: Rationalist or Dogmatist?Herbert Granger - 2010 - Ancient Philosophy 30 (1):15-38.
Reversing 30 Years of Discussion: Why Causal Decision Theorists Should One-Box.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):95-122.
Sinn Oder Gewissheit?: Versuche Zu E. Theol. Kritik D. Dogmatist. Denkens.Walter Mostert - 1976 - Mohr Siebeck.
Salomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical Assessments (Review).Daniel Breazeale - 2005 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (1):119-121.
Dogmatism, Probability, and Logical Uncertainty.David Jehle & Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 95--111.
The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432.
Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2019-02-18
Total views
275 ( #39,238 of 2,507,887 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
56 ( #14,765 of 2,507,887 )
2019-02-18
Total views
275 ( #39,238 of 2,507,887 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
56 ( #14,765 of 2,507,887 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads