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Relativism and Expressivism
In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge (2020)
Abstract
Relativism and expressivism offer two different semantic frameworks for grappling with a similar cluster of issues. What is the difference between these two frameworks? Should they be viewed as rivals? If so, how should we choose between them? This chapter sheds light on these questions. After providing an overview of relativism and expressivism, I discuss three potential choice points: their relation to truth conditional semantics, their pictures of belief and communication, and their explanations of disagreement.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities.Nate Charlow - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Russell Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 211-230.
The nature of disagreement: matters of taste and environs.Jeremy Wyatt - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10739-10767.
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