Relativism and Expressivism

In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Relativism and expressivism offer two different semantic frameworks for grappling with a similar cluster of issues. What is the difference between these two frameworks? Should they be viewed as rivals? If so, how should we choose between them? This chapter sheds light on these questions. After providing an overview of relativism and expressivism, I discuss three potential choice points: their relation to truth conditional semantics, their pictures of belief and communication, and their explanations of disagreement.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Relativism (and expressivism) and the problem of disagreement.James Dreier - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-110.
Faultless Disagreement.Dan Zeman - 2019 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge. pp. 486-495.
On the contrary: disagreement, context, and relative truth.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2011 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews and University of Oslo
From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism.Matthew Chrisman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225-254.
Discourse Contextualism.J. L. Dowell - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):562-566.
Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1.Alex Silk - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:195.
Epistemology without metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
Epistemic Modality.Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-03

Downloads
912 (#19,500)

6 months
131 (#44,805)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bob Beddor
University of Florida

Citations of this work

Expressivism about explanatory relevance.Josh Hunt - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (9):2063-2089.
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities.Nate Charlow - 2019 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 211-230.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references