Mind:fzab041 (forthcoming)

Authors
Bob Beddor
National University of Singapore
Carlotta Pavese
Cornell University
Abstract
According to a rich tradition in philosophy of action, intentional action requires practical knowledge: someone who acts intentionally knows what they are doing while they are doing it. Piñeros Glasscock (2020) argues that an anti-luminosity argument, of the sort developed in Williamson (2000), can be readily adapted to provide a reductio of an epistemic condition on intentional action. This paper undertakes a rescue mission on behalf of an epistemic condition on intentional action. We formulate and defend a version of an epistemic condition that is free from any luminosity commitments. While this version of an epistemic condition escapes reductio, it comes with substantive commitments of its own. In particular, we will see that it forces us to deny the existence of any essentially intentional actions. We go on to argue that this consequence should be embraced. On the resulting picture, intentional action is not luminous. But it still entails practical knowledge.
Keywords intentional action  knowledge  luminosity  control  margin for error
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzab041
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References found in this work BETA

Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):101-26.
Know-How, Action, and Luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.
Freedom to Act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.
Two Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.

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Citations of this work BETA

Skills as Knowledge.Carlotta Pavese & Beddor Bob - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.

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