The Non-­‐Redundant Contributions of Marr’s Three Levels of Analysis for Explaining Information Processing Mechanisms

Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):312-322 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Are all three of Marr's levels needed? Should they be kept distinct? We argue for the distinct contributions and methodologies of each level of analysis. It is important to maintain them because they provide three different perspectives required to understand mechanisms, especially information-processing mechanisms. The computational perspective provides an understanding of how a mechanism functions in broader environments that determines the computations it needs to perform. The representation and algorithmic perspective offers an understanding of how information about the environment is encoded within the mechanism and what are the patterns of organization that enable the parts of the mechanism to produce the phenomenon. The implementation perspective yields an understanding of the neural details of the mechanism and how they constrain function and algorithms. Once we adequately characterize the distinct role of each level of analysis, it is fairly straightforward to see how they relate

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Marr's Attacks: On Reductionism and Vagueness.Chris Eliasmith & Carter Kolbeck - 2015 - Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):323-335.
Marr and Reductionism.John Bickle - 2015 - Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):299-311.
Marr on computational-level theories.Oron Shagrir - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):477-500.
Can Computational Goals Inform Theories of Vision?Barton L. Anderson - 2015 - Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):274-286.
The Role of Natural Constraints in Computational Theories of Vision.Peter Alan Morton - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
Constructing a Philosophy of Science of Cognitive Science.William Bechtel - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):548-569.
Content individuation in Marr's theory of vision.Basileios Kroustallis - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):57-71.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-22

Downloads
218 (#89,123)

6 months
13 (#182,749)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

William Bechtel
University of California, San Diego
Oron Shagrir
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

References found in this work

Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Representation Reconsidered.William M. Ramsey - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Top-down causation without top-down causes.Carl F. Craver & William Bechtel - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):547-563.
Abstraction and the Organization of Mechanisms.Arnon Levy & William Bechtel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):241-261.

View all 23 references / Add more references