Philosophy of Science 64 (4):S95 - S106 (1997)
AbstractNew research tools such as PET can produce dramatic results. But they can also produce dramatic artifacts. Why is PET to be trusted? We examine both the rationale that justifies interpreting PET as measuring brain activity and the strategies for interpreting PET results functionally. We show that functional ascriptions with PET make important assumptions and depend critically on relating PET results to those secured through other research techniques
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Citations of this work
Interlevel Experiments and Multilevel Mechanisms in the Neuroscience of Memory.Carl F. Craver - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S83-S97.
The Philosophy of Neuroscience.John Bickle, Pete Mandik & Anthony Landreth - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Philosophy of Neuroscience.Bickle John, Mandik Peter & Anthony Landreth - 2007 - In Thaddeus Metz (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap.W. R. Webster - 2002 - Synthese 131 (2):275-287.
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