Abstract

The aim of Nordenstam’s capable but compact book is to examine the analytic-synthetic distinction and its relationship to empiricism in light of the criticisms expressed by W. V. Quine’s "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," M. G. White’s "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," and N. Goodman’s "On Likeness of Meaning." Nordenstam cites Pasch’s summary of the controversy: "Empiricism presupposes a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. There is no sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements in natural languages but only in artificial languages. But the artificial language approach is incompatible with empiricism. Therefore, empiricism has to be abandoned, or at least it has to be modified." In addressing this argument, Nordenstam begins with an explication of some of the basic concepts: the various interpretations of the principle of analyticity, the gradualist positions of Quine et al., the principle of empiricism, and the relationship between these two principles. From this analysis he concludes that one can legitimately hold the principle of empiricism and still reject the principle of analyticity, thereby denying the first assumption of the above argument. Focusing attention on the opposition to the analytic-synthetic distinction, he introduces a number of criticisms by Quine et al. of some twelve common definitions of "analytic statement" involving the notions of synonymy, state-descriptions, and semantical rules of artificial languages. Here Nordenstam’s suggestion is that the resultant criteria of analyticity and synonymy demanded by Quine et al. are excessively stringent.