Defending logical pluralism

In Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches. Stanmore: Hermes. pp. 1-22 (2001)

Abstract

We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.

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Jc Beall
University of Notre Dame

References found in this work

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Negation in Relevant Logics (How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Routley Star).Greg Restall - 1999 - In Dov Gabbay & Heinrich Wansing (eds.), What is Negation? Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 53-76.
Truth and Objectivity.R. M. Sainsbury - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):899–904.
Entailment.Robert K. Meyer - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (21):808-818.
Paraconsistent logics!Greg Restall - 1997 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 26 (3):156-163.

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Citations of this work

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Making Sense of Logical Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):433-454.
Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.
What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be.Rosanna Keefe - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.

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