Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):546-559 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Another view has entered the metaethical debate—relaxed realism [Dworkin 1996; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014]. Relaxed realists claim that there are irreducible moral properties, but seek to avoid the...

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Relaxing Realism or Deferring Debate?Michael Ridge - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (3):149-173.
What’s Wrong with Relaxing?Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):725-742.
I Can't Relax! You're Driving me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
A semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism.David Copp - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):569-591.
Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim?Guy Kahane - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):148-178.
Against Moral Intellectualism.Zed Adams - 2013 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.
Darwin and moral realism: Survival of the iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.
Moral realism and metaphysical anti-realism.Joel J. Kupperman - 1987 - Metaphilosophy 18 (2):95–107.
Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
A Survey of Logical Realism.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4775-4790.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-19

Downloads
100 (#167,981)

6 months
9 (#250,037)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Annika Böddeling
University of Graz

Citations of this work

Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism.Mark Warren & Amie Thomasson - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 526-53.
Is expressivism theologically acceptable?StJohn Lambert - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (2):121-131.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 49 references / Add more references