On Floyd and Putnam on Wittgenstein on Gödel

Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):197-210 (2004)
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Abstract

odel’s theorem than he has often been credited with. Substantively, they find in Wittgenstein’s remarks “a philosophical claim of great interest,” and they argue that, when this claim is properly assessed, it helps to vindicate some of Wittgenstein’s broader views on G¨.

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Timothy Bays
University of Notre Dame

References found in this work

On Putnam and His Models.Timothy Bays - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):331.
On Putnam and his models.Timothy Bays - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):331-350.

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