Contrastivism Rather than Something Else? On the Limits of Epistemic Contrastivism

Erkenntnis 69 (2):189-200 (2008)
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Abstract

One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too relaxed concerning the third relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of the knowledge relation.

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Peter Baumann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Moral skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.

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