The theory of the process of explanation generalized to include the inconsistent case

Synthese 143 (1-2):63 - 88 (2005)
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Abstract

.  This paper proposes a generalization of the theory of the process of explanation to include consistent as well as inconsistent situations. The generalization is strong, for example in the sense that, if the background theory and the initial conditions are consistent, it leads to precisely the same results as the theory from the lead paper (Halonen and Hintikka 2004). The paper presupposes (and refers to arguments for the view that) inconsistencies constitute problems and that scientists try to resolve them

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2009-01-28

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Diderik Batens
University of Ghent

Citations of this work

The Need for Adaptative Logics in Epistemology.Diderik Batens - 2004 - In Shadid Rahman, John Symons, Dov Gabbay & Jean Bendegem (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 459-485.
Towards Paraconsistent Inquiry.Can Baskent - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (2).

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