On a logic of induction

Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):221-247 (2005)
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Abstract

In this paper I present a simple and straightforward logic of induction: a consequence relation characterized by a proof theory and a semantics. This system will be called LI. The premises will be restricted to, on the one hand, a set of empirical data and, on the other hand, a set of background generalizations. Among the consequences will be generalizations as well as singular statements, some of which may serve as predictions and explanations.

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2009-01-28

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Diderik Batens
University of Ghent

Citations of this work

The Need for Adaptative Logics in Epistemology.Diderik Batens - 2004 - In Shadid Rahman, John Symons, Dov Gabbay & Jean Bendegem (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 459-485.
Empirical progress and ampliative adaptive logics.Joke Meheus - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):193-217.

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