Synthese 125 (1-2):5-18 (2000)

Diderik Batens
University of Ghent
In an adaptive logic APL, based on a (monotonic) non-standardlogic PL the consequences of can be defined in terms ofa selection of the PL-models of . An important property ofthe adaptive logics ACLuN1, ACLuN2, ACLuNs1, andACLuNs2 logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this isjustified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance). Theproperty fails for Priest's LP m because its way of measuring thedegree of abnormality of a model is incoherent – correcting thisdelivers the property.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005208424356
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References found in this work BETA

Against Global Paraconsistency.Diderik Batens - 1990 - Studies in East European Thought 39 (3-4):209-229.
Against Global Paraconsistency.Diderik Batens - 1990 - Studies in Soviet Thought 39 (3-4):209-229.
Dialectical dynamics within formal logics.D. Batens - 1986 - Logique Et Analyse 29 (14):161.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Universal Logic Approach to Adaptive Logics.Diderik Batens - 2007 - Logica Universalis 1 (1):221-242.
What If? The Exploration of an Idea.Graham Priest - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
A General Characterization of Adaptive Logics.Diderik Batens - 2001 - Logique Et Analyse 173 (175):45-68.
The Need for Adaptative Logics in Epistemology.Diderik Batens - 2004 - In Shadid Rahman, John Symons, Dov Gabbay & Jean Bendegem (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 459-485.

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