In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. pp. 182--193 (2013)

Bana Bashour
American University of Beirut
In this chapter, I wish to present an account of virtue ethics that does not base virtue solely on dispositions to behave in some way, but in the set of psychological states attributed to a person. In doing so, this modified account deals with all the problems the traditional virtue ethicist faces. I will start this chapter by presenting the main objections to virtue ethics: first, that it does not tell one how to act (which a moral theory should be aimed at); second, that virtues are culturally dependent; and third, that people don’t have a fixed character since their actions are too context- dependent. I will then move on to explain a new naturalized approach to virtue ethics, one taking some insights about how to think of intentional states from Dan Dennett. I will show how this new account deals with the problems raised for virtue ethics. I will then present additional advantages of this theory and explain how, contrary to some objections, this still is a version of virtue ethics.
Keywords Virtue Ethics  Dennett  Naturalized ethics  Action Theory
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How Did She Get So Good? On Virtue and Skill. [REVIEW]Bana Bashour - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):563-575.

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