Competion, Diffidence, and the Loss of Enjoyment. An Aspect of Hobbes' Leviathan

Ideas Y Valores 64 (159):47-62 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Competencia y desconfianza son consideradas por Hobbes fuentes básicas de la agresión. Se muestra que responden a lógicas diferentes: Mientras que la competencia conduce a la agresión concreta y motivada por el deseo sensible de objetos, la desconfianza supone un rendimiento cognitivo mayor; a saber, el considerar a cualquier otro como enemigo y a los objetos como medios de aseguramiento futuro, mediante la anticipación y la lucha por el poder. Al devenir esto último prototipo de la acción racional, el disfrute de objetos tiende a ser relegado a la irracionalidad. La novedad esta en evidenciar esta cuestión y algunas de sus consecuencias. According to Hobbes, competition and diffidence are basic sources of aggression. The paper argues that different logics are involved in these causes of quarrel. While competition leads to concrete aggression, motivated by a desire for objects based on the senses, diffidence requires a greater cognitive effort and leads to aggression against others considered as potential enemies. In the latter case, objects matter as a means to future safety, through the anticipation of and the struggle for power, deemed to be prototypes of rational action. In this respect, the enjoyment of objects tends to be relegated to the sphere of irrationality. The novelty of our approach lies in making evident the issue and some of its consequences.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,139

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knowledge of God in Leviathan.Stewart Duncan - 2005 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (1):31-48.
Hobbes on Civil Association.Michael Oakeshott - 1975 - Berkeley: Liberty Fund.
I. Yet Another Hobbes.David P. Gauthier - 1969 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):449-465.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-01-02

Downloads
16 (#830,801)

6 months
4 (#573,918)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Add more references