Abstract

The problem of good, for all its fundamental importance, has been studied systematically only occasionally in the history of philosophy. The Greeks were concerned with it and so too are the moderns, but it was almost disregarded during the ages of faith. Apparently it is only in periods of moral transition, when there is widespread rejection of traditional standards, that people begin to ask: What, after all, is goodness? What does it mean to call something good? An Enquiry into Goodness is part of the modern discussion of the problem. Its author served for a period with the British Intelligence Corps in Israel where, we are told, “his interest in ethical problems was first aroused by the irreconcilability of conflicting claims.” Professor Sparshott is an Oxford graduate, but his book is, in some respects, pleasantly uncharacteristic of the Oxford Moralist school. In controversial matters he looks for guidance not merely to the moderns, but to the ancients and even the medievals. The definition of good which he proposes is not far removed from the traditional Aristotelian–Thomist one. This is the first time that this concept, or any approximation of it, has been treated seriously by an English moralist. It is, apparently, the first time it has received extensive analysis anywhere. Scholastic textbooks seem to regard its validity as self–evident and content themselves usually with a bald assertion and a confirmatory quotation from St. Thomas. This attitude may have been excusable in the past; in the context of a Christian morality the Aristotelian concept is, I suppose, unquestionable. But it is highly unsatisfactory at present when so many moralists speak from a purely humanist standpoint.