Abstract

The chapter explores the architecture of the concept of the separation of powers, by means of distinguishing several components which make up the conceptual but also institutional structure of separation of powers. We then identify particular deficiencies in both the theory and practice of separation of powers, furnishing our conceptual exploration with examples of populist assaults on the principle of separation of powers, as they happened mainly, although not exclusively, in the Central European context. The intended contribution is three-fold. First, we show that it is necessary to divide the concept of separation of powers into smaller components that can be studied conceptually as well as empirically. We do so by unpacking the concept into four components (separation of institutions, separation of functions, personal incompatibility, and checks and balances) and exploring their limiting and enabling pedigrees. Second, we show that all of these four components embody limiting and enabling elements, but each of them does so to a different extent. This inevitably results in tensions. Consequently, third, each constitutional system, when designing framework of government, must make its own choices and adopt its own combination of enabling and limiting elements.